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Introduction
1  In the Supreme Court’s first consideration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA),
Chief Justice Earl Warren began by remarking that “The Constitutional propriety of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged with reference to the historical experience
which  it  reflects.”2 Although  Chief  Justice  John  Roberts  quoted  the  passage  from
Katzenbach in his 2013 opinion overturning the coverage formula in Section 4 of the Act,
he took a very different stance toward history than his predecessor did. Devoting only
two short sentences to the painstaking 84-page opinion of federal district court judge
John Bates3 and only seven more to the thorough 32-page majority opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia by Judge David S. Tatel,4 Chief Justice Roberts
dismissed  the  15,000-page  record  compiled  by  Congress,  which  the  lower  courts
discussed  extensively,  as  irrelevant  because  “Congress  did  not  use  the  record  it
compiled to  shape a  coverage formula grounded in current  conditions.”5 “History,”
Roberts reminded us, “did not end in 1965. By the time the Act was reauthorized in
2006, there had been 40 more years of it.”6 Yet apart from comparing voter registration
rates  in  1965  and  2004  in  six  Deep  South  states7 and  making  a  brief,  misleading
reference to the rate of Department of Justice objections to election law changes,8 the
Chief Justice ignored that history. 
2 What if we delve into the history that Chief Justice Roberts disregarded? What if we
look  at  where  proven  violations  of  the  VRA  and  related  laws  and  constitutional
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provisions actually took place and at the course of those violations over time? How do
the geographical and temporal patterns from the years shortly before the passage of
the  Act  in  1965  through  the  years  after  its  latest  renewal  in  2006  reflect  on  the
adequacy of the Section 4 coverage formula that the Chief Justice summarily rejected as
“based on decades-old data and eradicated practices?”9 What can we learn about how
voting  rights  law  has  actually  worked  by  arraying  the  patterns  of  legal  actions
involving minority voting rights in maps and charts? Although Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion rested  entirely  on  his  assertions  that  voting  rights  violations  had severely
declined and that  they were no longer concentrated in jurisdictions covered under
Section  4  of  the  VRA,  he  only  briefly  and  superficially  examined  the  “historical
experience”  that  he  and  Chief  Justice  Warren  before  him  considered  key  to  “the
Constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act.” When we examine that experience
in detail, will we reach the same conclusions that Chief Justice Roberts announced in
Shelby County?
3  To answer questions about the adequacy of the Section 4 coverage scheme, as well as
about the nature of and reasons for the patterns of legal events involving voting rights,
I have compiled the largest database on such events in existence. Drawn largely from
lists  of  cases  and  other  actions compiled  by  civil  rights  organizations,  individual
attorneys,  and  the  Department  of  Justice,  the  database  has  been  supplemented  by
ferreting out details and following case citations from published cases, from PACER,
and from newspaper articles. The events include any successful or unsuccessful case,
published  or  not,  decided  or  settled;  Section  5  objections  and  “more  information
requests” by the Department of Justice; and election law changes that manifestly took
place as a result of the threat or reality of legal challenges. The sources are described in
Appendix A to this paper, and the methods of expanding the information from cases
and objections that appeared in the lists are described in Appendix B. Collection and
manipulation of the data began in 2009, and it continues. The data, which starts with
the first successful modern voting rights law, the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and proceeds
with some confidence into 2006 and then no doubt less comprehensively into 2014, is
incomplete and contains (unintentional)  errors and omissions.  Nonetheless,  it  is  far
larger  than  any  of  the  single  sources  that  were  presented  to  Congress  during  the
process  of  renewing the VRA in 2006 and that  were scrutinized in the district  and
appeals  court  opinions in Shelby County.  For example,  Prof.  Ellen Katz’s  database of
Section  2  cases,  discussed  extensively  during  the  2006  congressional  hearings  and
included in my database with Katz’s  kind permission,  contains 324 cases.  The total
number of cases and other events in which the minority side was successful contained
in my database is currently 4173.
 
Mapping the Voting Rights Act
4  The most dramatic way to assess the adequacy of the coverage scheme is to consider a
series of maps. Map 1 looks at every county in the 48 contiguous states.10 Each county in
which no event took place during the entire 57-year period is colored blue, while the
projections extending above every county that experienced a “successful” legal event –
i.e., an event in which the minority side won – is proportional to the number of events
in the county over the whole period. Red counties experienced the largest number of
events, orange counties the second largest, and so on, down to blue-gray, for counties
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with one or two events. The total number of county-level events was 3839. The 334
events that took place on the state level, such as challenges to state redistrictings, are
not included in the county-level maps, but they are taken into account in the graphs.
5  The conclusion from Map 1 is simple to state. The number of high-rises over the South,
the focus of  the Section 4  coverage scheme,  dominates  the real  estate.  Outside the
South, only New York City, where there were 137 precinct boundary changes in 2001
that were objected to by the Justice Department, and California, where I have included
numerous events connected to the 2001 California Voting Rights Act, contain many tall
buildings. 
6 Map 2 outlines the Section 4 coverage scheme that the majority of the Supreme Court
overturned in Shelby County, an outline that will be familiar to most readers of this
article. Comparing it to the Map 1 tracing of the counties where an election rule or law
was  overturned,  the  coverage  scheme looks  to  have  been  quite  precise.  That is,  it
accurately  predicted  the  locations  of  the  proven  voting  rights  violations  over  the
period, the vast majority of them since 1965, to which Chief Justice Roberts referred. Of
the 3839 county-level events, 3519 or 91.7 % took place in covered jurisdictions.11
 
Map 1: Voting Rights Events by County, 1957-2014
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Map 2: Counties Covered Under Section 4 at the Time of Shelby County v. Holder
7 But not all counties are of the same size. The 19 events that took place in Dallas County,
Texas, with a voting-age population in 2010 of 1,713,876, should perhaps not count as
much as the 10 events in Dawson County, Texas, which had a voting-age population in
2010 of 10,411. Map 3 divides the number of events in each county for the whole period
by the total population and rescales the color markers to reflect the change. It reflects
the same general pattern, but puts much more emphasis on the rural South, which was
the principal focus of attention of the 1965 Act.
8  Map 4 changes the observer’s point of view, looking at 57 years of voting rights history
as  someone  from  the  North  might  have  seen  it.  From  the  North,  restrictions  on
minority voting rights look like almost entirely a southern and southwestern problem.
In 2009, in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, Chief Justice Roberts
pointedly questioned whether the problems that Section 5 had been meant to address
in 1965 were still “concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.”12 In
Shelby County,  he quoted that passage from Northwest  Austin and criticized Congress
because it had failed to “narrow[] the scope of the coverage formula” since 1965, and
because  it  had  neglected  to  determine  “how  that  discrimination  [in  covered
jurisdictions] compares to discrimination in States unburdened by coverage.” The 1965
coverage formula was outmoded, he said,  because “today’s statistics tell  an entirely
different story.” If not in 2006, then certainly after Northwest Austin, the Chief Justice
remarked disapprovingly,  Congress  should have produced an “updated statute.”  “If
Congress  had  started  from  scratch  in  2006,  it  plainly  could  not  have  enacted  the
present coverage formula,” the Chief Justice announced, and he contended that the
relationship  of  the  coverage  formula  to  problems  of  vote  dilution  was  purely
“fortuitous.”13
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Map 3: The Number of Voting Rights Events, 1957-2014, Divided by the County Populations
 
Map 4: Northern View of Voting Rights Events, 1957-2014
9  What might the pattern of voting rights cases and other violations look like over time
and space if we try to visualize the description implicitly pictured in the Chief Justice’s
majority opinion in Shelby County? Because discrimination in the Deep South in 1965
was, as he describes it, “pervasive . . .flagrant . . .widespread . . . rampant,” we should
presumably  hypothesize  that  the  number  of  events  was  large,  and  that  it  shrank
markedly over time as, in the Chief Justice’s words, “due to the Voting Rights Act, our
Nation has made great strides.”14 Even though there might have been an actual increase
in events as the Act gave the government and civil rights attorneys more legal tools,
and there might have been periodic increases in legal cases and objections challenging
the  decadal  redistrictings,  the  trend  would  have  traced  a  linear  decline,  and  the
realization that discrimination was no longer so concentrated in the South would have
led to an increasing proportion of cases being filed and won outside the South. This
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hypothetical picture might look like Figure 1, where the area outlined in red represents
covered jurisdictions and that in blue, those not covered in Section 4.15
10  How  does  the  hypothetical  graph  compare  to  that  based  on  reality?  Figure  2
substitutes  non-fiction  for  fiction,  and  it  paints  a  very  different  picture  from  that
underlying the majority opinion in Shelby County.16 Before 1965, when we know that
discrimination was most rampant, there were very few cases. As Department of Justice
and non-governmental civil rights lawyers got more experience with the VRA, as legal
cases  were  decided  favorably,  and  as  Section  5  was  extended  and  Section  2  was
amended, the number of events mushroomed. When, later, the Supreme Court sharply
and  suddenly  reined  in  the  Act,  particularly  in  a  series  of  cases  in  the  1990s,  the
number of events shrank just as markedly as it had grown in the 1970s and 80s.17 But
until  2009,  when  a  large  number  of  jurisdictions  began  to  change  from  at-large
elections to single-member districts under the threat of lawsuits under the California
Voting Rights Act, included here for completeness, the graph is almost entirely red.
Before 2009, 93.8 % of all cases and other events (including statewide cases) took place
in covered jurisdictions, and there was only a small increase in the number of cases
outside covered areas.
 
Figure 1: A Hypothetical Timeline of Voting Rights Events as Chief Justice Roberts Might Have
Seen Them in Shelby County, 1957-2014
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Figure 2: Actual Timeline of Voting Rights Events, 1957-2014, by Covered and Non-Covered
Jurisdictions
93.8 % in covered jurisdictions, 1957-2009
11  Another way to visualize the data is  to  compare maps of  the events  by county in
different time periods. Maps 5 and 6 summarize voting rights legal actions that took
place in the years before Congress clarified Section 2 and effectively encouraged its use
in 1982 with actions over a similar number of years from 1982 on, ending in 2005, which
was the last year which members of Congress considering renewal would have been
able to look at before voting. Perhaps the chief justice was wrong about the shift of
voting rights violations from south to north,  but right about the downtrend in the
sheer number of events.  Maps 5 and 6 provide strong evidence against both of the
contentions.  Although  there  is  a  bit  of  suburban  sprawl  into  South  Florida  and
Southern California, the skyscrapers were markedly higher and denser in Map 6 than in
Map  5,  and  they  were  still  highly  concentrated  in  the  neighborhoods  redlined  by
Section 4.18 In the 24 years from 1957 through 1981, there were 807 events (including
those at the state level); in the 23 years from 1982 through 2005, there were 3095 events
– nearly four times as many as during the earlier period. In the first period, 98.1 % of
the events originated in covered jurisdictions; in the second period, 93.1 % of the much
larger total.
12  Congress in 2006 was not presented with maps or other documents that laid out the
pattern of proven voting rights infractions so starkly, but it received plentiful evidence
in the form of lists and discussions of cases that showed that the problems were still
overwhelmingly concentrated in the South and that discrimination continued to be
widespread.19 A northern senator or member of the House, or a southern member who
was sympathetic  to  minority  voting rights,  who read the 15,000 pages  of  evidence,
would no doubt form in her mind images looking something like Maps 4-6 or Figure 2.
The few cases in non-covered jurisdictions that were noted during the debates20 must
have seemed like trivial exceptions to the overwhelmingly dominant pattern, because
in fact, they were. And the map would have shown that the number of voting rights
infractions had increased, not decreased, compared to the earlier period. It is easy to
understand why someone who formed an image like Maps 4-6 – based on the evidence,
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not on outmoded stereotypes or prejudices against the South – would see little reason
to modify the coverage formula and every reason to continue the Act in full vigor.
 
Map 5: Early Voting Rights Activity: Voting Rights Events, 1957-81
 
Map 6: Voting Rights Activity Still Concentrated in the South and Southwest, 1982-2005 
13 The  framers  of  the  1965  Act  had  only  a  general  idea  of  where  the  most  serious21
restrictions would take place in the future, and they used a blunt tool, a combination of
a history of  “tests and devices” for voting and a pattern of low overall  turnout,  to
target those areas. That formula was substantially amended in 1975 to include states
and counties that had printed ballots only in English, if  at least five percent of the
people of the area were “language minorities,” which added Texas, Arizona, Alaska, and
scattered counties elsewhere to the coverage scheme.22 In his opinion in Shelby County,
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Chief Justice Roberts barely mentioned this amendment, which did not include political
participation at all in the formula, a surprising omission in light of the fact that over a
thousand events,  nearly a  quarter  of  the total,  originated in Texas alone.  When he
explicitly discussed the coverage formula, the Chief Justice referred only to the original
1965 formula,  not the 1975 expansion. So Section 4 contained two formulas,  one of
which  was  based  on  turnout  and  the  other,  on  a  very  small  percentage  of  the
population that formed a “language minority” – without any test of their ability to
speak or read English. But on the evidence of Maps 1 and 3-6 and Figure 2, it appears
that the blunt tools of Section 4 succeeded in accurately homing in on the counties and
states where the vast majority of violations would take place during the Chief Justice’s
forty (and more) years since 1965. Far from “fortuitous,” the relationship between the
adjusted formula  and proven discrimination over  the  period since  1965 was  nearly
perfect,  the  coverage  about  as  narrowly  tailored  and  precisely  targeted  as  a  large
nationwide regulatory scheme could be. 
 
Counterfactuals Show How the Supreme Court Has
Shaped Voting Rights Reality
14 There were three basic innovations in Section 5:  First,  election laws or practices in
suspect areas would be frozen at a certain time. Second, any change would have to be
approved by an authority outside of the South, either the District Court of the District
of Columbia or the Department of Justice. Third, the jurisdiction would bear the burden
of proving that it had not acted in a discriminatory manner. These prophylactic devices
derived from the experience of attorneys, especially from the Department of Justice
and especially during their attempts to litigate cases under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957
and  1960.23 Although  the  congressional  hearings  on  the  1965  bill  spotlighted  that
experience, Congress did not design the coverage scheme by focusing it only on the
states and counties in which there had been legally proven charges of voting rights
violations. If it had done so, there would have been many fewer states and counties
covered,  as  Map 7,  which details  the geographic pattern of  successful  voting rights
cases from 1957 to 1965,  shows.  There were only 73 successful  cases in those eight
years, or about an average of ten a year, despite considerable efforts by a talented corps
of Justice Department attorneys. All except one, a 1965 challenge to a literacy test in
Monroe County, New York,24 were in a pocket of rural counties in Alabama, Georgia,
Mississippi, and Louisiana. 
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Map 7: The Very Small Core of the Coverage Scheme: Voting Rights Events From 1957 Through
1965
15  Why were there so few successful cases when the Civil Rights Movement was so active
in trying to register voters in the South and when the Department of Justice was for the
first  time  since  the  First  Reconstruction  actively  attempting  to  foster  black  voting
rights in the South?25 The obvious answer is that the legal tools and resources that were
available were few and unwieldy, federal courts were often hostile, and there simply
had not been enough judicial  opinions,  especially at the Circuit and Supreme Court
levels, to settle many questions and smooth the path to victories by the civil rights
forces. As has often been noted, the insufficiency of the tools was precisely why the
VRA was needed. But that insight, emphasized by the contrast between the generally-
recognized level  of  discrimination in  1965  and the  small  number  and geographical
compactness of the violations exposed by Map 7, has not been systematically applied to
the  history  of the  VRA  after  its  passage,  perhaps  because  no  one  before  now  has
charted the whole sweep of successful challenges to anti-minority discrimination in its
whole history.
16  Applied and expanded, the insight counsels that the number and character of voting
rights  violations  recorded  is  a  function  not  only  of  the  extent  or  depth  of
discrimination,  but  crucially,  it  is  also  a  function  of  the  tools  made  available  or
restrained, particularly by judicial decisions. Thus, by rendering decisions that make it
easier or harder to bring and win voting rights cases or make objections, the Supreme
Court can, in effect, manipulate the evidence of discrimination, which it can then use,
in a second stage, to justify a decision to further weaken or strengthen the tools. It can
create the reality that it subsequently reacts to. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have
done exactly that.
17  The database contains a great many illustrations of this self-fulfilling prophecy or self-
generating-evidence hypothesis. Figure 3 shows not only the effect of legal changes and
court decisions on the success of cases brought under Section 2 of the VRA, but it also
demonstrates, once again, the concentration of discrimination in jurisdictions subject
to preclearance under Section 4 before Shelby County ripped the covers off. Section 2
applies nationally, so that if discrimination were equal everywhere, one would expect
to see an equal amount of blue and red in the graph. Instead, five out of every six
successful Section 2 cases were filed in covered jurisdictions. Only in the foothills of the
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very most recent period, not in the mountains of the glory years of the VRA during the
Reagan and Bush I Adminstrations, does the amount of blue equal or sometimes surpass
the amount of red in Figure 3. That is surely less important than accounting for the
upthrust  of  the  mountains  from  1983  through  1995  and  the  sudden  declension
thereafter. 
 
Figure 3: Successful Section 2 Cases in Covered and Non-Covered Jurisdictions, 1957-2014
82.7 % in covered jurisdictions
18 Before 1982, Section 2 was barely used at all, and it was in limbo after Justice Stewart’s
decision, for a four-person plurality, in the 1980 case of City of Mobile v. Bolden,26 that to
be constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, Section 2 had to be interpreted as
requiring proof of intentional discrimination. But when Congress amended the statute
in 1982 to provide that it was only necessary to prove a discriminatory effect, and when
it carefully specified a series of factors that would satisfy the burden of proof, attorneys
hastened to file Section 2 cases, judges felt obliged to award victories to plaintiffs who
ticked off the items on the Senate’s list, and jurisdictions became eager to settle out of
court. The number of successful cases exploded from 3 in 1981 to 121 by 1984. After a
majority  of  the  Supreme  Court  sustained  the  1982  congressional  amendments  and
seemingly simplified the evidence necessary for minority plaintiffs to win in the 1986
case of Thornburg v. Gingles,27 the number of minority Section 2 victories rose to 175 in
1988.  By  contrast,  after  a  conservative  5-4  majority  ruled  that  redistricting  which
increased the number of minority opportunity districts was suspect in the 1993 Shaw v.
Reno case28 and followed that by ruling in Miller v. Johnson29 that a district drawn with a
“predominant” (minority) racial intent was unconstitutional whatever its shape, the
number of  Section 2 cases plummeted from 80 in 1995 to just  6  in 2001.  Attorneys
rightly feared that Shaw and Miller reflected a general change in the Supreme Court’s
attitude toward voting rights, one that would affect all issues, not just redistricting.
19  The amount of racial discrimination in election laws did not suddenly skyrocket in
1982, and it did not suddenly abate in 1995. Just as the earlier maps made clear that
discrimination  continued  to  be  concentrated  in  covered  jurisdictions,  Figure  3
demonstrates that the ebb and flow of cases proving discrimination has been largely
due to responses to decisions by Congress and the courts.
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20  Figure 4 demonstrates that a similar story can be told about Section 5 as about Section
2. Section 5 matured before Section 2, but only because the Supreme Court decision in
Allen v. Board of Elections30 in 1969 allowed Section 5 lawsuits and objections to election
laws that diluted minority votes, and not just to those that affected the individual right
to vote per se. The number of successful Section 5 cases and objections rose from 4 in
1968 to 76 in 1976. Then in 1976, the Supreme Court clamped down, ruling in Beer v. U.S.
31 that not all election law changes that had a discriminatory effect were illegal, only
those that actually made minorities worse off than they had previously been. Laws that
could be shown to have had a discriminatory intent, usually a more difficult matter to
prove, were still deemed violative of Section 5. The number of Section 5 events dropped
by half, to 38, by 1981. But Congress in a footnote to the authoritative Senate Report
97-417 on the 1982 amendments to the VRA suggested that the Department of Justice
should  effectively  ignore  Beer and  refuse  to  preclear  any  election  law  that  had  a
discriminatory  effect,  not  just  those  that  were  retrogressive.32 That  suggestion,
combined  with  the  increasing  willingness  of  the  Department  of  Justice  to  accept
evidence that election law changes had been adopted with a discriminatory intent,33
allowed the number of Section 5 objections and requests to local and state jurisdictions
for more information to grow after 1982. They reached a pinnacle of 89 in 1992, the
year before Shaw v. Reno.
 
Figure 4: Section 5 Objections and Cases, 1957-2014
21  What if Allen had been decided the other way and Congress had not acted to overturn
or at least undercut it? What if the VRA had always been confined, as Justice Clarence
Thomas has explicitly favored,34 only to guaranteeing minorities the right to vote, not
to attack election structures that deny them an equal opportunity to elect candidates of
their choice in areas where there is racially polarized voting? Or what if Beer had been
decided in 1970, before the 1971 round of redistricting, or even earlier? At that point,
there were very few African-Americans or Latinos who had been elected to any offices
in the South. Any contention that a change in an electoral structure would make them
worse off  than being able  to  elect  no representatives  at  all  could easily  have been
dismissed as purely speculative, if not entirely illogical – because it would be hard to
retrogress starting at zero. Or, on the other hand, what if Shaw v. Reno had decided that
Do The Facts of Voting Rights Support Chief Justice Roberts’s Opinion in Shel...
Transatlantica, 1 | 2015
12
redistricting  that  took  race  into  account  in  order  to  rectify  generations  of  racial
discrimination in politics or to comply with Sections 2 and/or 5 of the VRA was entirely
consonant with the constitution?35 
22  Historians  and  philosophers  have  often  employed  such  counterfactuals  to  explore
causal statements. When used carefully, a counterfactual can be a powerful mode of
argument.36 This dataset makes it  possible to answer at least some of the questions
about the effects of Supreme Court decisions empirically, thereby casting further light
on the contentions of Chief Justice Roberts about the trends in racial discrimination in
voting.
23  Figure 5 charts successful Section 5 objections and lawsuits over time.37 The blue area
is the same as in Figure 4, but the red portion deletes objections and lawsuits to enforce
Section  5  if  those  objections  or  lawsuits  concerned  election  structures  –  at-large
elections,  residency  requirements,  numbered  seat  requirements,  majority-vote
requirements, annexations, and redistricting. Most of the remaining objections concern
changes in voting laws that might have been contested even if the Allen decision had
never been made, such as precinct line changes, alterations in candidate qualifications,
voting registration procedures, and purges of voter lists. Only about a quarter of the
Section 5 objections and lawsuits, 421 rather than 1523, would have been lodged if vote
dilution had been excluded from Section 5. The difference between the red and blue
areas illustrates with considerable accuracy the effect of the Allen decision. Moving Beer
back to 1971 or earlier would probably have had the same effect as eliminating Allen,
because it would have placed the comparison date for a retrogressive effect at a point
when there were almost no minority officeholders, making a Section 5 objection to an
electoral structure nearly impossible.
 
Figure 5: Charting the Effect of Allen: Section 5 Objections If No Vote Dilution Mechanisms Had
Been Considered Illegal, Compared to What Actually Happened
72.4 % fewer events without Allen (421, instead of 1523)
24  We  can  specify  an  analogous  counterfactual  in  order  to  weigh  the  effect  of  the
Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in Mobile v. Bolden. If Congress had not amended Section
2 in 1982 to reverse Bolden’s intent requirement, then it is logical to assume that no
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Section 2 cases would have been filed thereafter,  because intent cases could just as
easily have been brought under the 14th and/or 15th amendments. Assuming that Allen
and Beer had actually  been decided when they were and just  as  they were,  we can
isolate the effect  of  Bolden by subtracting Section 2  cases after  1982 from the total
number of  voting rights  events.  Figure 6  accomplishes  this  in  a  fashion parallel  to
Figure 5.  By construction,  the red and blue areas are entirely congruent with each
other until  1982.  After 1982,  they diverge,  the blue area representing all  the actual
events, the red, all the events except the 1174 Section 2 cases that took place after 1982.
We assume, contrary to fact, that Congress did not strengthen Section 2 by overturning
Bolden. (As is well known, the young John Roberts was one of the leaders of the Reagan
Administration’s fight against the Bolden amendment.)38 
 
Figure 6: Voting Rights Events if Bolden Had Not Been Overturned
28.4 % fewer total events if Bolden had not been reversed (2999, instead of 4173)
25  The effect of the decision, cutting off more than a quarter of all the successful voting
rights events, is forcefully portrayed in Figure 6. The mountains are leveled, the valleys
deepen, and the whole graph looks much more subdued from 1982 until 1999, after
which the red and blue areas converge.  It  is  not unrealistic to postulate that there
would have been substantially fewer measurable voting rights events but for the 1982
congressional “Bolden amendment.” Six hundred and eleven of the total 1174 Section 2
events that took place after 1982 were consent agreements or settlements. It is difficult
to imagine nearly so many lawsuits being favorably concluded without going to trial if
the plaintiffs had had to bear the burden of proof in intent cases. 
California Shows That There Is Still a Need for Voting
Rights Acts
26  If  the  precipitous  decline  in  the  number  of  voting  rights  events  after  1995  is  not
enough  to  convince  a  reader  that  the  relative  dearth  of  very  recent  cases  and
objections is to a considerable degree the result of Supreme Court rulings that make it
more difficult for minority plaintiffs to win voting rights cases, perhaps a glance at
California will. California is now a majority-minority state, and the Latino population
has been increasing since 1970 at a much more rapid rate than the proportion of Latino
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officeholders  has.  Hundreds of  city  councils,  school  boards,  and community college
boards throughout the state are elected at-large, but Latinos have not succeeded in
being elected to those bodies in nearly the proportions that their co-ethnics comprise
in the population or even in the citizen voting-age population.39 Voting rights lawyers,
led by former Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund attorney Joaquin
Avila, sought for years to attack this problem by bringing lawsuits under Sections 2 and
5 of the VRA, but their success was uneven.40 When an opportunity presented itself,
Avila  and Robert  Rubin  of  the  Leadership  Conference  on  Civil  Rights  drafted  what
became the California Voting Rights Act (CVRA), signed into law in 2002.41 Compared to
Section  2  of  the  national  VRA,  the  CVRA  reduced  the  proof  needed  to  establish  a
violation to evidence that voting was racially polarized in the jurisdiction and, to a
lesser extent, to a showing that minorities had difficulty getting elected there. There
was no intent requirement, and minorities did not have to satisfy the “Gingles factor” of
proving that they could comprise a majority of the voting-age or citizen voting-age
population of a prospective district. In practice, another provision of the CVRA turned
out to be crucial: If minority plaintiffs win, they and their attorneys may be awarded
fees  and costs,  including expert  witness  fees,  but  if  they lose,  they do not  have to
reimburse the jurisdiction unless their lawsuit is determined to be “frivolous.” Unlike
in federal litigation, plaintiffs may be held to be “prevailing parties” (and thus collect
fees and costs) if there is a “causal connection” between their lawsuit and a change in
the defendants’ behavior – for example, if a defendant jurisdiction switches from at-
large  to  district  elections  once  a  lawsuit  is  announced,  even  if  only  minimal  legal
paperwork  is  ever  filed.42 This  last  provision  encourages  lawyers  to  file  numerous
lawsuits  without  the  fear  of  having  to  carry  them through  complicated  hearings,
depositions, and trials, and it encourages local jurisdictions to settle well before they
begin to run up large bills.
27  After Stanislaus County Superior Court Judge Roger M. Beauchesne in 2005 declared
the CVRA unconstitutional because it benefitted only minorities, it took more than two-
and-a-half years for the California Court of Appeal to overturn the lower court decision
and for the California and U.S.  Supreme Courts to decline to overturn the Court of
Appeal. What happened next considerably amplified the effect of the ruling in Sanchez
v. Modesto:43 Avila and Rubin, who had litigated the case, were awarded $ 3 million in
legal fees, a number that reverberated loudly in city halls and school board offices just
as the Great Recession savaged their budgets.44 Facing large costs, local jurisdictions
began to settle cases and to preclude lawsuits  by switching to districts  before they
could be sued, and attorneys who had never filed voting rights cases before began to
enter  the  field.  Because  school  boards  and  community  college  boards  must  seek
permission from state governing bodies before changing their electoral structures, we
have both a fairly complete, though frequently updated, record of which local bodies
planned to abandon at-large elections and proof that they were doing so to avoid or
settle lawsuits.45
28 Figure 7 shows the initial results of the effort to integrate Latinos into the local
governing  structures  of  California  by  forcing  districts  to  substitute  district  or
sometimes, proportional representation methods of election for the previous at-large
rules. There were only 32 successful VRA lawsuits under Sections 2 or 5 in California
from 1965 to 2007. After the CVRA pressure ratcheted up and both sides in potential
lawsuits had hired expert witnesses or consultants to perform statistical analyses of
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racial polarization in relevant elections, districts began to settle in droves. This was
especially  the case  with school  districts  that  had majority-  or  near-majority  Latino
student populations, but no Latino school board members. One hundred and sixteen
city  councils,  school  boards,  or  community  college  boards  changed  their  electoral
structures as a result of the CVRA, at the time of this writing. Figure 7 shows a massive
red spike, representing CVRA cases after 2008, which will probably broaden as more
data becomes available.
 
Figure 7: California Proves That Discrimination Persists If You Have the Tools to Find It
29  California  did  not  suddenly  become  more  discriminatory  after  Sanchez  v.  Modesto.
Indeed, it is unquestionably less discriminatory than when in 1994 a majority of voters
favored Proposition 187, which sought to deny governmental services, including public
schools, to undocumented persons. What actually happened was that the CVRA and the
favorable decision in Sanchez gave attorneys the tools with which to expose existing
discrimination and to cure it. If attorneys across the nation had similarly sharp tools,
not instruments blunted or destroyed altogether by Supreme Court rulings since 1993,
they  might  well  uncover  discriminatory  electoral  structures  and  restrictions  on
individual  voting  rights  comparable  to  or,  likely,  at  greater  levels  than  those  in
California. Of 340 American cities where more than 20 % of the population is black,
African-Americans enjoy less representation on the city councils than their proportion
in the population in 338.46 Most of these cities are in the South, and at least some have
at-large elections or elect officials in off-year elections. Especially in the light of the
publicity given to the underrepresentation issue by the example of Ferguson, Missouri,
many  of  these  cities  would  be  targets  for  reform  if  other  states  had  laws  like
California’s or if federal court rulings made the lower federal courts more favorable
venues for VRA lawsuits.
 
Alternative Explanations of Comparisons and Trends
30  Although the geographical and temporal patterns in the data described above seem to
make an unanswerable case for the adequacy of the coverage formula and the need for
a mechanism to counter continuing discrimination in political rules, there might be
other explanations for the patterns. It is conceivable that anomalies in the data, a lack
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of comparability of covered and non-covered counties, or an exhaustion of targets of
discrimination  might  account  for  the  results.47 Closer  examination,  however,  will
dismiss these alternatives.
 
Did the Data Guarantee Finding the Coverage Scheme Adequate?
31 As to data anomalies,  if  there were a large number of “more information requests”
(MIRs), these relatively insignificant events48 might overwhelm the rest of the data and
therefore bias the results, especially if all such requests were included, and not just
those that  resulted in changes in questionable Section 5  submissions.  But  in fact,  I
included only the 1051 MIRs that resulted in changes in or withdrawals of apparently
discriminatory changes in state or local election laws or practices, and those successful
MIRs amounted to only 25.2 % of all the 4173 events. If we exclude the 1051 MIRs from
the calculations, then the percentage of events that took place in covered jurisdictions
before 200949 falls from 93.8 to 91.5 – still an overwhelming concentration in the areas
targeted in the pre-Shelby Section 4.
32 If we continue along this line and exclude all the events due to Section 5 or MIRs, which
could only take place in covered jurisdictions, leaving only Section 2, constitutional,
and a small number of Section 203 (language discrimination) cases, still, 83.4 % of the
total number of successful events before 2009 took place in covered jurisdictions.50 And
this proportion no doubt understates the concentration of discriminatory propensity,
for in covered jurisdictions, many discriminatory actions were negated by Section 5
objections or lawsuits, and others were aborted because of the knowledge that such
actions would not survive Section 5 review. There was not as great a need to file Section
2 or fourteenth or fifteenth amendment cases in covered jurisdictions, because other,
more efficient tools were available. 
 
Do The Patterns Hold in Demographically-Similar Areas?
33 But  it  might  be  contended  that  many  non-covered  jurisdictions  were  unlikely  to
produce cases of racial discrimination against minorities, because there were too few
minorities to bother to discriminate against (a contention that ignores a great deal of
American history)51 or at least, that there were too few minorities to have a sufficient
chance to affect elections to give the minorities an impetus to agitate for changes in
election laws or to sue. So suppose we compare counties in non-covered jurisdictions
with appreciable minority populations to those in (pre-Shelby)  covered jurisdictions
with similar minority proportions.
34 There  are  3143  counties  or  county-equivalents  in  the  current  United  States,  if  we
include  the  District  of  Columbia.  From  1957  through  2014,  2390  of  those  counties
experienced no voting rights events that I have so far identified. Of those 2390, 2111
were  in  non-covered  jurisdictions  and  279  in  (pre-Shelby)  covered  jurisdictions.52
Suppose that we assume that a county in which the non-Hispanic white citizen voting-
age  population  in  2010  was  less  than  80 %  was  likely  to  contain  a  minority
concentration at least somewhere in the county that might seek to elect a candidate of
its choice and might therefore be seen as a threat to non-Hispanic white control of
politics.  To  compare  demographically  similar  counties  in  covered  and  non-covered
jurisdictions, then, let us divide the counties into those with minority citizen voting age
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populations of 20 % or more, and those where non-Hispanic whites comprised more
than 80 % of the CVAP.
35 Table 1 provides a first pass at the question of whether the amount of discrimination
was  the  same  in  those  covered  and  non-covered  jurisdictions  that  were
demographically similar to each other. The answer is very striking. Nearly five times as
high a percentage of covered as of non-covered counties with white CVAPs of less than
80 % experienced at least one voting-rights event over the period from 1957 through
2014 (80.9 % to 17.8 %). Furthermore, minorities won cases in covered jurisdictions in
much higher proportions than in non-covered jurisdictions.53 Nearly seven times as
high a proportion of counties with white CVAPs of less than 80 % witnessed a successful
event in covered as in non-covered counties. The contrast between covered and non-
covered counties in the percentage of events in counties that were over 80 % white
CVAP is almost exactly the same as in the under-80 % white CVAP counties (38.1 % to
7.3 %). 
 
Table 1: A Much Higher Percentage of Covered Than Non-Covered Counties Experienced Voting













 %   Counties   with
Successful Events
>80 % 38.1 36.0 7.3 6.2
<80 % 80.9 80.3 17.8 11.9
36  
37  But Table 1 counts only the proportions of counties with any events or any successful
events at all. If non-covered counties contained a larger average number of events than
covered counties did, then the contrast would be less stark. Table 2 reveals that the
reverse  is  true.  Although  there  was  a  much  larger  number  of  uncovered  than  of
covered counties where the non-Hispanic white percentage of the CVAP in 2010 was
greater than 80 %, the covered counties produced nearly five times as many events, and
over six times as many successful events as the uncovered counties (first row of Table
2). The success rate in covered overwhelmingly white counties was 94 %; that in non-
covered  overwhelmingly  white  counties,  only  67 %.  Even  more  impressive  is  the
contrast between covered and non-covered counties in which the white CVAP in 2010
was less than 80 % (second row of Table 2). Nine-tenths of the events in the total of 964
less than 80 % white CVAP counties came from the 661 covered counties, and only one
tenth from the 303 non-covered counties. The contrast between successful events was
even more pronounced: 92 % of the successful events that originated in less than 80 %
white  CVAP counties  came from covered jurisdictions.  The  success  rate  in  covered
counties was 95 %; in non-covered counties, 76 %.
38  To summarize these numbers: Even when we confine our focus to those counties with
an  appreciable  number  of  minorities,  there  is  still  a  very  pronounced  difference
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between covered and uncovered jurisdictions. The rate of electoral discrimination that
has been proven in demographically similar covered counties was several times as high
as in uncovered counties. Evidently, there was something special about the counties
singled out in the two formulas in Section 4, perhaps a history that trumped or at least
supplemented their sociology.
 
Table 2: More than 90 % the Total Number of Events Came from Covered Jurisdictions, Even in
Counties with Significant Minority Percentages
 %  Non-Hispanic
White CVAP, 2010










>80 % 300 283 66 44
<80 % 3415 3236 364 276
 
Was It Shaw or Had Minority Political Power Maxed Out?
39  A final possible contention is that the temporal pattern of decline in the number of
voting  rights  events  after  the  mid-1990s  reflected  not  the  discouraging  effect  of
adverse Supreme Court decisions, but the exhaustion of minority political opportunity.
54 According  to  this  line  of  reasoning,  in  the  1990s  round of  redistricting,  African-
Americans  and  Latinos  had  been  granted  nearly  all  of  the  majority-minority  state
legislative and congressional seats possible, and under the non-retrogression principle
of Section 5, subsequent redistrictings would likely maintain those seats. Since voting
was racially polarized, minority candidates who reflected the views of their co-ethnics55
were unlikely to win “whiter” seats, and in any event, they had no Section 2 claims
except where they could form majorities of the potential voters in a district and no
right under Section 5 to any new district, whatever the minority percentage in an area.
56 Because the classic voting discrimination restrictions, such as literacy tests and poll
taxes,  had declined since 1965, leaving redistricting as the principal focus of voting
rights lawsuits and Section 5 objections, the number of events was bound to decline
after the mid-1990s, whatever the Supreme Court held in its decisions in Shaw v. Reno, 
Miller v. Johnson, and their progeny.
40  This  is  a  much  more  nuanced  gloss  on  political  and  social  trends  than  the  Chief
Justice’s view in Shelby County, and it is even more markedly different from the popular
conservative belief that racial discrimination has been almost entirely extinguished. It
recognizes that racial conflict and discrimination may continue in attenuated form, but
denies  that  Supreme  Court  decisions  themselves  exaggerated  that  attenuation  or
created  a  new  reality.  But  like  the  legal  and  lay  conservative  views,  this  more
sophisticated scenario  concludes  that  the  Voting Rights  Act  was  bound to  fall  into
disuse after the 1990s round of redistricting, and that therefore, the demise of Section 5
was of little moment, the judicial recognition of a fait accompli destined to be brought
about by more fundamental political and social forces.57
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41  This  view  is  misleading  for  five  principal  reasons:  First,  it  treats  redistricting,
especially  redistricting  for  Congress  or  state  legislatures,  as  more  static  and  more
central to the operation of the VRA than it has been. Second, it fails to explain why a
decline in the opportunity for minorities to gain seats through redistricting should
affect every provision of the Act and every form of discrimination so uniformly. Third,
it does not account for the counter-trend in California. Fourth, it neglects to place the
inquiry in the larger context of the history of racial discrimination in voting in the
United States, a history of a constant, continual search for new and/or different tools
to maintain white supremacy.  And fifth,  it  ignores the recrudescence after  Shaw of
individual-level voting restrictions similar to the so-called “first-generation barriers”58
that were the focus of most pre-1965 voting rights lawsuits. 
42  First, then, despite their importance and popular prominence, only 21 % of the voting
rights  events  from 1957 through 2014 concerned redistricting.  A larger  proportion,
27 %, had to do with at-large elections, and three other structural provisions – majority
vote requirements, numbered posts, and annexation – accounted for 15 % of the events.
Other events were too diverse to characterize easily. But the overall point is that nearly
80 % of the voting rights events – nearly 75 % since 1991 – were not about redistricting.
59
43  Nor was redistricting in the covered jurisdictions as static as the “maxed-out thesis”
seems to assume. Population in the ten states that were fully or largely covered under
Section 4 of the VRA60 grew by 39 % from 1990 to 2010, which was sufficiently more
rapid than the rest of the nation that these states gained 12 new congressional districts
to go with the 96 that they held after the reapportionment between states of the early
1990s.  Every  new seat  (or  loss  of  a  seat,  as  in  Mississippi  in  2000)  represented  an
opportunity to reshuffle power, even if there had been little geographic mobility within
each state. Perhaps more important, although the black percentage, 20 %, was almost
exactly the same in 2010 as in 1990, the Latino proportion of the population in these ten
covered states nearly doubled, going from 10 % to 19 %. And the minority populations
were constantly in motion, 49 % of the African-Americans and 57 % of the Latinos in the
South (as well as 45 % of non-Hispanic whites) moving their residence from 1995 to
2000, for example. Even if the 1990s redistricting cycle had approached a practical limit
on  the  overall  number  of  majority-minority  congressional  seats  in  the  covered
jurisdictions, population movements and demographic shifts left plenty of room for
discriminatory and non-discriminatory choices, especially at the levels of city, county,
and state legislative districts.61 And every such choice harbored the possibility  of  a
lawsuit, depending on the legal climate set by the U.S. Supreme Court.62 
44  A paradigmatic example of the continuing complications of redistricting in light of
population  growth,  demographic  changes,  and  partisan  struggles,  and  of  the
continuing  relevance  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act,  was  the  congressional  redistricting
drawn by Texas Republicans in 2011 plan in the Dallas-Fort Worth “Metroplex.” To
control seven of the eight districts in the area, in which the population was only 50.2 %
non-Hispanic white, Republicans packed as many African-Americans as possible into
one Dallas district and extended tentacles from suburban/exurban counties into the
minority areas of the central cities. In a technological tour de force, the redistricting
experts extracted just enough African-Americans and Latinos and paired them with
just  enough suburban whites to prevent minorities  from winning or even seriously
influencing any other  districts.63 Only  the  extremely  complex  litigation under  both
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sections 2 and 5, still ongoing four years later, resulted in a plan in which minorities
could elect one more candidate of their choice. Racial redistricting litigation was hardly
maxed out after Shaw.
45  Even  if  statewide  redistricting  for  Congress  and  state  legislatures  had  faded  as  a
possible VRA subject after the 1990s round of redistricting, that alone would not have
caused the dramatic drop-offs  in voting rights events after 1993,  because statewide
redistricting never comprised a large proportion of the total events. Of 2608 events
involving minority victories between 1965 and 1993, when Shaw was decided, only 88
(3 %) involved statewide redistricting. To be sure, many of these statewide cases were
extremely significant for the distribution of political power. But many commentators
have failed to appreciate the extent to which almost all VRA politics before Shaw was
local. 
46  The second problem with the maxed-out thesis is that even if redistricting litigation
declined because minorities had won nearly all the districts they could at both the state
and local levels, that in itself would not explain why litigation and objections would
decline simultaneously under other provisions of  the VRA or with respect  to other
discriminatory  mechanisms.  Indeed,  one  might  have  expected  that  voting  rights
attorneys freed from the mathematical quagmires of redistricting plans would happily
switch  to  attacking  at-large  elections,  annexations,  and  other  discriminatory
mechanisms.
47 But in fact, as Figures 8 and 9 show, there was an across-the-board decline in Section 2
lawsuits and Section 5 objections, as well as in lawsuits attacking every facet of the
electoral structure after the mid-1990s. Before Shaw and Miller, the temporal patterns of
Section 2 and Section 5 actions were largely independent of each other, reacting, as
Figures 3-6 above showed, to separate Supreme Court decisions on each section of the
Act. After 1995, as Figure 8 makes clear, actions based on both Section 2 and Section 5
declined  in  tandem.  Even  if  fewer  new  discriminatory  laws  had  been  passed  in
jurisdictions  covered  by  Section  5  after  1993,  that  should  have  left  voting  rights
attorneys and the Clinton Justice Department more time and energy to file Section 2
cases  against  existing  discriminatory  laws  or  new  ones  passed  in  non-covered
jurisdictions.  And  Figure  9  shows  that  there  was  a  similar  pattern  of  minimal
correlation between the number of  lawsuits on redistricting and at-large and other
electoral  rules before 1995 and a parallel  decline after 1995,  with two exceptions –
redistricting cases rose again after the decadal redistricting of 2001, and at-large cases
jumped after the California Voting Rights Act became operative in 2007.64 The patterns
in Figures 3-6 and 8-9 show that successful attacks on discrimination followed favorable
Supreme Court decisions and that unfavorable Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s
preceded the only across-the-board decline in actions in the history of the VRA. These
patterns strongly suggest  that  it  was these adverse Supreme Court  decisions,  not a
maxing  out  of  political  opportunities  for  minorities,  that  produced  the  decline  in
events that the Chief Justice then used in Shelby to rationalize a further constraining of
minority political opportunities.
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Figure 8: Shaw and Miller Constrain and Coordinate Sections 2 and 5
 
Figure 9: Shaw and Miller Depress All Lawsuits, Not Only in Redistricting
48  Figure  9  also  reminds  us  of  the  third  problem  with  the  maximum  opportunity
suggestion  –  that  when  it  became  legally  easier  to  attack  at-large  elections  in
California, attacks proliferated. Obviously, opportunities to elect further minorities had
not  been  exhausted.  They  had  been  squashed  by  unfavorable  decisions  of  the  U.S.
Supreme Court.
49  The fourth and larger problem with the maxed-out thesis is  that it  disregards the
history of racial discrimination in politics in America. When the Fifteenth Amendment
made it unconstitutional to ban people from the suffrage explicitly because of their
race,  the  game  changed.  First,  as  soon  as  white  supremacists  violently  took  over
legislatures during and after Reconstruction, they adopted election structures, such as
gerrymandered districts or at-large elections, that disadvantaged minorities as a group.
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Then,  they  established  rules  that  facilitated  administrative  discrimination,  such  as
appointing  registration  and  polling  place  officials  who  would  bend  the  law  to
discriminate.  Finally,  they  made voting  participation  contingent  on  correlates  of
individual  racial  characteristics,  such  as  literacy  and  wealth,  which  brought  about
widespread disfranchisement.65 The same types of laws and practices continued once
African-Americans began to vote in large numbers in the South after the abolition of
the white primary in 194466 and especially, after the passage of the VRA in 1965. 
50 One means of discrimination could substitute for another that had been successfully
attacked, and each successive law could be rationalized as having a non-racial purpose.
For example, at-large elections could be painted as attacks on political machines or
literacy  tests  as  efforts  to  produce  a  more  civically-conscious  electorate.67 Even  if
African-Americans  and  Latinos  had  reached  the  maximum  number  of  majority-
minority  legislative  seats  that  their  numbers  allowed,  that  would  not  preclude  the
adoption by the majority of other methods of racial disadvantage – indeed, a growth in
black and brown power would invite political opponents to seek alternatives, as they
had repeatedly  done since 1870.  The genius  of  Section 5  and to  a  lesser  extent,  of
Section 2 of the VRA, was that they were flexible remedies, attempts to counter future,
unpredictable moves in the game of electoral discrimination. To the extent that the
maxed-out thesis or a “decline in racism” thesis assumes that that game has ended, it
slights the nation’s history.
51  The  widely-noted  “voter  suppression”  laws  that  proliferated  in  the  wake  of  the
weakening  of  legal  barriers  to  discrimination  in  Shelby  County were  actually  a
continuation  of  a  trend  since  2000  of  laws  that  made  it  harder  for  individuals  to
register and vote, and such laws constitute the fifth problem with the exhaustion of
opportunity thesis. The two most significant and hotly contested types of laws were
those requiring voters to identify themselves at the polls with an often very restricted
number of official documents bearing their photographs,68 and the disfranchisement of
convicted criminals, often continuing long after their confinement and probationary
periods had ended.69 Criminal disfranchisement was an old device clearly adopted with
a racially discriminatory intent in the postbellum South,70 which gained power with the
explosion of incarceration, especially black incarceration, beginning in the 1980s.71 
52 In addition, other new laws that were likely to have disproportionate impacts on the
ability  of  African-Americans  and/or  Latinos  to  vote  included  statutes  requiring
documentary proof of citizenship before one could register to vote; repeals of same-day
registration and curtailments of pre-election-day voting, both of which had been used
disproportionately  by  racial  minorities;  restrictions  on  private  voter  registration
campaigns, which had registered blacks and Latinos at twice the rate of non-Hispanic
whites; and refusals to allow votes cast in the wrong precinct (usually because voters or
polling places had moved) to count for higher offices, which had a larger impact on the
more geographically mobile minority populations than on the somewhat less mobile
non-Hispanic whites. From 2011 through 2014, 13 states passed more restrictive voter
identification  laws;  3  states  made  it  harder  to  restore  voting  rights  to  those  with
criminal convictions; 9 states passed laws requiring proof of citizenship to register to
vote or restricted registration drives; 8 states cut back on early voting or same-day
registration; and North Carolina curtailed out-of-precinct voting on election day. Nine
of  the  15  states  covered  in  whole  or  in  part  under  Section  5  before  Shelby  County
instituted new individual-level restrictions on voting since 2010.72
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53 Many of  these  laws were  challenged in  court  under  Section 2  of  the  VRA,  but  the
lawsuits  have  been  lengthy  and  very  expensive  for  proponents  of  minority  voting
rights, and at the time of this writing, none has been resolved by the U.S. Supreme
Court. When the cases are decided, the way may be opened, as it was with Shelby, for
the passage or strengthening of many other laws making it more difficult for minority
citizens to vote.73 In any event, the proliferation of such laws is one more proof that the
establishment of so many new legislative and congressional majority-minority districts
in the early 1990s did not toll the end of electoral discrimination or account for the
decline  in  the  number  of  voting  rights  events.  The  Supreme Court  majority,  in  its
decisions  from  Shaw through  Shelby  County,  encouraged  further  legal  assaults  on
minority voters, and those voters continued to resist, even as their legal tools were
increasingly blunted. 
 
Conclusion: It Was Still a Congruent and Proportional
Remedy
54 During  preparations  for  congressional  consideration  of  amendments  to  the  VRA in
2006, commentators frequently warned that the Supreme Court might employ its ruling
in City of Boerne v. Flores74 to question whether Congress had assembled enough evidence
of discrimination to satisfy a majority of the justices that Section 5 was still “congruent
and  proportional”  to  the  problem.75 As  a  consequence,  “ Boerne”  became  the
abbreviation for the reason for compiling such a huge record for that renewal, a much
larger compilation of evidence than for the original passage or the renewals of 1970,
1975, or 1982.76 It therefore came as a surprise to proponents of minority voting rights
that in Shelby County, Chief Justice Roberts not only did not discuss the evidence that
Congress had so carefully prepared, but also that he did not cite or mention Boerne in
his opinion.77 Indeed, the chief justice did not consider the level of scrutiny at all and
seemed to propose a “logical” basis test, rather than the traditional “rational” basis test
that the Supreme Court had employed in Katzenbach and that Justice Ginsburg explicitly
relied upon in her dissent in Shelby County.78 Evidence from vote dilution cases,  the
Chief Justice asserted, did not justify continuing to use the initial Section 4 coverage
formula,  because  it  was  “based  on  voting  tests  and  access  to  the  ballot,  not  vote
dilution.”79 In other words, a coverage formula must not merely isolate a problem; the
problem that it spotlights must constitute the formula. If that is really what the Chief
Justice meant, then evidence largely from cases concerning electoral structures would
be irrelevant to evaluating the strength of his opinion.
55 But such a reading cannot be justified, because it would implicitly undercut 44 years of
judicial and congressional decisions. The Chief Justice did not purport to overrule so
many cases  or  to  discount  the  three  rounds  of  congressional  renewal  of  Section  5
before 2006. When a 7-2 majority of the Supreme Court ruled in 1969 in Allen v. State
Board of Elections that Section 5 pertained to changes in electoral structures, as well as
to measures touching the individual right to vote, it rejected dissenting Justice John
Marshall  Harlan’s  argument  that  its  interpretation  logically  and  practically
disconnected Section 5 from Section 4’s formula.80 Although Chief Justice Roberts did
not  explicitly  mention  Justice  Harlan’s  position,  his  argument  closely  paralleled
Harlan’s. From 1969 until 2013, both Congress and the Court had repeatedly explicitly
accepted the majority’s position in Allen, only Justices Thomas and Scalia rejecting it in
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Hall v. Holder. In its renewals of Section 5 in 1970, 1975, and 1982, Congress specifically
approved Allen81 and relied on evidence from vote dilution cases as a justification for
renewal. The Supreme Court also specifically reaffirmed the majority opinion in Allen
and  accepted  that  Section  5  covered  vote  dilution  in  its  three  cases  previous  to
Northwest  Austin that  explicitly  considered the validity  of  Section 5. 82 In  fact,  every
major Supreme Court case that has considered Section 5 contentions from Perkins v.
Matthews83 and  Beer to  Georgia  v.  Ashcroft84 and  Northwest  Austin has  explicitly  or
implicitly considered that dilutive practices are subject to Section 5. If he had meant to
reject all of these precedents on the meaning and constitutionality of applying Section
5 to  electoral structures,  the Chief  Justice  would surely  have made the point  more
clearly. We may therefore conclude that the record of VRA cases and objections since
1969 is relevant to assessing the empirical support for Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in
Shelby County.
56 And that empirical support was critical, because even the theoretical underpinnings of
the Chief Justice’s opinion rested on empirical grounds. Despite the fact that Katzenbach
had  rejected  an  attack  on  Section  5  that  was  based  on  a  case  that  concerned  the
admission of new states,85 the Chief Justice in Northwest Austin had asserted that “the
fundamental  principle  of  equal  sovereignty”  of  the  states  called  into  question  any
coverage scheme that treated states differently. In Shelby County, he insisted even more
strongly on “the tradition of equal sovereignty” of the states, which he did not connect
explicitly  to  any  constitutional  provision.86 But  a  departure  from  that  principle  or
tradition could be justified, as Chief Justice Roberts said it had been at the time of the
first passage of the VRA in 1965, by evidence that the problems to be remedied were
focused principally on a few states and localities.87 Thus, even the theoretical
justification of the Chief Justice’s opinion can be seen to have rested on two empirical
generalizations: First, that voting discrimination had declined so much by 2006 that
Congress  no longer  had sufficient  justification to  address  it.  Second,  that  whatever
discrimination remained was no longer concentrated in the states and counties singled
out by Section 4. 
57 This paper marshals more evidence, more systematically than any previous research, to
assess  those  two  propositions,  and  it  rejects  both.  An  objective  observer  in  2006
comparing the number and location of all successful voting rights events in the period
since the last renewal in 1982 with the events of the years from 1957 to 1981 would
conclude that Section 5 needed to be renewed, and that the coverage scheme still fit
the problem remarkably well, hitting the target about 94 % of the time. Even among
Section 2 cases, which could be filed anywhere in the country, 83.2 % of the successful
cases from 1982 through 2005 originated in covered jurisdictions. Although these exact
statistics were not available, the interest groups on whose research the statistics are
largely based had made an overwhelming showing on the two points.88 To the extent
that there had been a decline in the number of cases and objections since the early
1990s, those who followed voting rights activity would have recognized the significance
of adverse Supreme Court opinions, which were heavily criticized by civil rights forces.
And experienced lawyers, such as most members of Congress, would have recognized
that more cases would be filed if precedents were favorable and fewer, if they were
unfavorable,  and that trends in successful  cases over time therefore reflected more
than merely the level of discrimination. 
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58 Whatever the degree or version of scrutiny that should have been applied in Shelby
County,  then  –  rational  basis,  congruence  and  proportionality,  or  compelling  state
interest and narrow tailoring – the evidence before Congress in 2006 or available now,
especially  including  the  most  recent  experience  under  the  CVRA,  should  have
supported an opinion upholding the coverage scheme in Section 4 and the continuation
of the supervision of voting laws under Section 5. When confronted with the facts of
the history of voting rights since Congress began to regulate it in 1957, Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion in Shelby County is found wanting. That history shows that the VRA
retained what Chief Justice Warren termed its “Constitutional propriety” in 2013. 
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Appendix A: Sources of Voting Rights “Events”
Cases Brought by the United States Department of Justice
Brief of the United States in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, pp. 44-45, n. 33 (cases, 1957-65).
Voting Rights Act, House Hearings, 1965, Tables B2(a), B3(a), B4(a).
Voting Rights Act, House Hearings, 1975, Serial No. 1, Part 1, pp. 198-216 (cases,
1965-75). 
Voting Rights Act, Senate Hearings, 1982, vol. I, pp. 1803-05, 1828-29, 1837-41, 1849
(1975- 82 cases). 
“Attachments to the Statement of Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Rights Division, Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate
Judiciary Committee on Amending the Voting Rights Act, March 1, 1982 (unpublished
12-page memo).
“Voting Section Cases in Which the United States’ Participation Began Since October 1,
1976“ (unpublished 27-page memo in Department of Justice, dated Jan. 17, 2008.
“Section 5 Declaratory Judgment Actions” (unpublished 12-page memo in Department
of Justice, dated Oct. 18, 2005).
“All Section 4 Bailout Cases Filed under the Current Bailout Standard through October
17, 2005 (unpublished, undated 2-page memo).
“Table 1: Voting Rights Cases Brought on Behalf of American Indians and/or
Interpreting the Voting Rights Act re Indian Interests” (unpublished, undated, 8-page
memo).
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Cases Brought by Public Interest Groups and Individuals or
Settlements Brought About by Such Cases
ACLU, “Voting Rights in the South: Ten Years of Litigation Challenging Continuing
Discrimination Against Minorities” (1982).
“Vote: The Case for Extending and Amending the Voting Rights Act: Voting Rights
Litigation, 1982-2006: A Report of the Voting Rights Project of the American Civil
Liberties Union.” available at. <http://www.aclu.org/voting-rights/case-extending-
and-amending-voting-rights-act/>.
ACLU “Promises to Keep: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act in 2006.” “ACLU Voting
Rights Project Litigation Docket: Sept. 2006-Sept. 2007,” available at: https://
www.aclu.org/voting-rights/aclu-voting-rights-project-annual-report-2006. 
“ACLU Voting Rights Project Litigation Docket: Jan. 2007-Dec. 2007,” available at: 
https://www.aclu.org/voting-rights/aclu-voting-rights-project-annual-report-2007.
“ACLU Voting Rights Project Annual Report: January 1, 2008-December 31, 2008,”
available at: https://www.aclu.org/voting-rights/aclu-voting-rights-project-annual-
report-2008.
“ACLU Voting Rights Project Annual Report, January 1, 2009-December 31, 2009,“
available at: < https://www.aclu.org/voting-rights/aclu-voting-rights-project-annual-
report-2009>.
“ACLU Voting Rights Project Annual Report: January 1, 2010-December 31, 2010,”
available at: https://www.aclu.org/voting-rights/aclu-voting-rights-project-annual-
report-2010.
“Voting Rights in Indian Country: A Special Report of the Voting Rights Project of the
American Civil Liberties Union” (September 2009). 
“Joaquin G. Avila Voting Rights Cases” (unpublished 15-page memo dated March 2009),
courtesy of Joaquin Avila. 
James U. Blacksher, List of “Dillard v. Crenshaw County”Cases, courtesy of James U.
Blacksher, (unpublished memo dated Aug. 3, 2009), courtesy of James U. Blacksher. 
James Blacksher, Edward Still, Jon M. Greenbaum, Nick Quinton, Cullen Brown and
Royal Dumas, “Voting Rights in Alabama: 1982-2006,” Review of Law and Social Justice, 17
(2008), 249-81.
Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, eds., Quiet Revolution in the South (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1994). Cases not explicitly referred to in book are available at: 
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/6646?
author[0] =Davidson %2C+Chandler&amp;paging.startRow =1. 
Anita Earls, Case Lists for North Carolina, 1982- (unpublished 38-page memo), courtesy
of Anita Earls. 
“Significant Cases” of Jose Garza (unpublished, undated, 2-page memo), courtesy of Jose
Garza. 
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Stanislaus Anthony Halpin, Jr., “The Anti-Gerrymander: The Impact of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 Upon Louisiana Parish Redistricting,” (Ph.D. thesis, George
Washington University, 1978).
Ellen Katz database on Section 2 cases, described in Ellen Katz, with Margaret
Aisenbrey, Anna Baldwin, Emma Cheuse, and Anna Weisbrodt, “Documenting
Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
Since 1982: Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, University of Michigan Law
School,”39 Univ. of Mich. Jl. of Law Reform 643 (2006), courtesy of Ellen Katz. 
George Korbel, “Litigation in Texas Relating to A. Statewide Redistricting B. Section 2
litigation against Texas cities and school districts C. Section 5 Objections to Statewide
Redistricting D. Section 5 Objections to Statutes relating to the Election Process in
Texas #. Litigation filed after the 2011 redistricting on submission to this Court”
(unpublished 13-page memo)), courtesy of George Korbel.
Brian K. Landsberg, Free at last to vote: the Alabama origins of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2007).
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, “Voting Rights in the States,”
(2006), available at
<http://www.civilrights.org/voting-rights/vra/states.html>. 
Justin Levitt, Database on Preclearance and More Information Requests, 2011, courtesy
of Justin Levitt.
Justin Levitt, “Questions for the Record from Senator Charles E. Grassley ‘From Selma to
Shelby County: Working Together to Restore the Protections of the Voting Rights Act’,
Senate Judiciary Committee, July 17, 2013” (unpublished 30-page memo), courtesy of
Justin Levitt.
National Commission on the Voting Rights Act, “List of Successful Section 2 and Section
5 Enforcement Actions in Selected Jurisdictions,” (unpublished, undated 39-page
memo) courtesy of Jon Greenbaum.
National Commission on the Voting Rights Act, “Voting Landscape: A State-by-State
Overview” (2014), available at: http://votingrightstoday.org/ncvr/resources/state-
pages.
Peyton McCrary, “The Struggle for Minority Representation in Florida, 1960-1990,” 
Florida Historical Quarterly, 86 (2007), 93-111, Appendix, “Cases That Resulted in
Elimination of At- Large Elections (Brought by David M. Lipman).” 
Peyton McCrary, “Declaration of Peyton McCrary in Shelby County v.
Holder” (unpublished 29-page declaration, 2010), courtesy of Peyton McCrary.
“Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund Litigation Timeline,
1968-2002” (unpublished 9-page memo), courtesy of Nancy Ramirez. 
“MALDEF Master List 2008, Political Access Program” (unpublished 4-page memo),
courtesy of Nancy Ramirez. 
“Cases Litigated by Rolando L. Rios & Associates, PLLC” (unpublished, undated 17–page
memo), courtesy of Rolando L. Rios. 
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Section Five Administrative Actions by the United States
Department of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice, Section 5 Objection List, 1965-2009, available at
<http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/obj_activ.php>. 
Computer file on “more information requests,” which served as the basis for Luis
Ricardo Fraga and Maria Lizet Ocampo, “More Information Requests and the Deterrent
Effect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,” in Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006:
Perspectives on Democracy, Participation, and Power (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Public Policy
Press, 2007), 47-82, courtesy of Luis Fraga. The more information requests that are
included here are those that Fraga and Ocampo considered “MIR-Induced Outcomes,”
i.e., those that were withdrawn, superseded, or to which the jurisdiction did not
respond. See Fraga and Ocampo, Table 3.2, pp. 59-62. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Notices of Section 5 Activity Under Voting Rights Act of 1965, As
Amended, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/notices/noticepg.php; U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Archive of Notices of preclearance activity under the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
as amended, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/notices/votarch.php. Only those
more information requests that resulted in withdrawn submissions, 2006-13, are
included. Courtesy of Justin Levitt. 
 
California Voting Rights Act Lawsuits and Changes Brought About
by Threats of Lawsuits or Preemptive Action to Avoid Lawsuits
California Board of Education Website 
<http://www.cde.ca.gov/search/searchresults.asp?
cx=001779225245372747843:gpfwm5rhxiw&
output =xml_no_dtd&filter =1&num =20&start =0&q =at-large %20elections. (Search for
waivers under CVRA).
California State Community College Board Website http://
californiacommunitycolleges.cccco.edu/ChancellorsOffice/BoardofGovernors.aspx.
(Search for waivers under CVRA).
“Drawing The Lines: Like it or loathe it, California’s Voting Rights Act is a force to be
reckoned with,” California Schools (Spring 2012), 40-47. Available at http://
www.csba.org/Newsroom/CASchoolsMagazine/2012/~/media/Images/NewsMedia/
PublicRelations/CASchoolsMagazine/2012/CaliforniaSchools_spring2012.ashx. 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, “LCCR Voting Rights Database Master List, CVRA
Challenges, Settlements & Voluntary Changes (2006-2013), courtesy of Joanna Cuevas
Ingram.
National Center for Education Statistics, Dataset ACS 2007-2011 Profile, California, All
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Appendix B: How the Dataset Was Compiled
Since of the case lists, only Prof. Ellen Katz’s was in the form of a database file, my first
undergraduate research assistant, Adam Adler, and I created a new Excel form which
eventually grew to contain a much larger number and range of categories than Prof.
Katz had coded. It began with Katz’s dataset and was expanded to include the lists from
the Department of Justice and from the American Civil Liberties Union and Leadership
Conference of Civil Rights lists and reports. Gradually, cases drawn from the other lists
in Appendix A were added, as well as the Section 5 objections from the Department of
Justice website and the list of “More Information Requests” from a dataset kindly
provided by Prof. Luis Fraga and Maria L. Ocampo. Only the 1051 More Information
Requests that resulted in a pro-minority change in an election law – for example, the
withdrawal of a change that the Justice Department thought would hurt minorities or a
shift from a less-pro-minority to a more-pro-minority districting plan – were included.
This makes the MIR data parallel with the objections under Section 5.
Each case or other event was traced to a specific county, and all counties in the U.S.
were entered into the dataset, whether they contained events or not, and given a
standard GIS indicator so that they could be coordinated with maps. Every case was
counted only once, whether it was appealed or not, and whether the outcome counted
as favorable for minorities or not was determined by the decision at the highest level in
which a judicial decision was rendered. Information on the ethnic composition of each
county’s population, voting age population, and, when available, citizen voting-age
population, both for 2000, 2010 and for the date at which a case was concluded or an
objection or MIR was made, were matched with each event.
Since there were so many diverse lists, many overlapping, a considerable effort was
made to avoid duplication by identifying each event with a specific name, civil action
number, and/or case citation. This was often very difficult, since some lists gave only
case names, others only case numbers, and others, only published case citations, and
since many case names were the same (for example, U.S. v. Texas). Sometimes, it was a
matter of judgment whether two cases with the same name should be represented as
one case or two. Where citations to published cases were available, an effort was made
to read them so that any more information that was available in them could be
extracted. For example, attorneys in some of the cases on Prof. Katz’s list had raised
constitutional issues, in addition to Section 2 issues, but she had not coded the
constitutional issues, because she was focused only on Section 2.
An effort was made to categorize the issues involved in each case and objection (if there
was more than one issue, the event was NOT counted more than once), as well as the
legal bases for each case. Cases below the state level were categorized by the form of
the local jurisdiction (city government, county government, education agency).
Attempts were made to identify the attorneys involved in each case by the organization
that they represented (U.S. government, ACLU, Mexican American Legal Defense and
Education Fund, etc.). Where possible, the ethnicity of the challenging or defending
minority plaintiff was noted. Sometimes, this was referred to in the text of cases;
sometimes, it was apparent from the case location (if Mr. Jones sued a school board in
Mississippi, there was a very low likelihood that he was Latino, Asian-American, or
Native American), or from the plaintiff’s last name. Where there were multiple
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plaintiffs with names of apparently different ethnicity, all of the relevant ethnicities
were coded.
Especially for the period before 1982 and after 2006, the footnotes and textual citations
to cases were searched for and linked to in order to expand the number of cases at
times when the available lists were inadequate. Footnotes and tables in monographs
and articles on the VRA were scoured for more case names and descriptions. For CVRA
cases, lists from the state board of education and state community college board were
supplemented by evidence from newspaper articles and such irregular sources as the
websites of consultants who specialize in advising school districts on CVRA matters.
Finally, a rather fruitless effort was made to discover other cases that resulted in
consent decrees or other settlements by examining subject categories in PACER and
reading the case files of cases linked to “voting” and similar topics.
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Right To Vote: Shelby County v. Holder,” 8 Harvard Law & Policy Review 39 (2014), at 43, n. 21. It
should  be  noted that  using “the  tradition of  equal  sovereignty”  to  assess  the  VRA coverage
scheme turned one of the requirements under strict scrutiny, “narrow tailoring,” on its head. If
the  law  required  all  areas  to  preclear  their  voting  law  changes,  it  would  not  only  be
administratively unworkable, but it would also be so unfocused on the most problematic areas as
to violate narrow tailoring. But under the Chief Justice’s analysis, if it treated different states
differently,  it  might  violate  “equal  sovereignty.”  The  only  way  to  thread  the  needle  of
constitutionality would be to use a formula that targeted precisely, and the Court would have to
evaluate the evidence of how well the formula worked or defer to Congress. In Shelby County, the
majority did neither.
87. Justice  Ginsburg harshly  and to  my mind,  convincingly,  criticized Chief  Justice  Roberts’s
novel use of the “principle of equal sovereignty” in her dissent in Shelby County, at 2648-49.
88. Especially convincing were the voluminous discussions of legal cases since 1982 published by
the American Civil Liberties Union and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, listed in the
appendix to this paper. It is hard to imagine reading these tomes and dismissing the problems of
voting rights as no longer consequential or as equally prevalent throughout the country.
1. The Chief Justice did not merely differ with the minority in Shelby County on whether it was
legally necessary to consider whether the level of voting rights discrimination in non-covered
areas continued to differ from that in non-covered areas, a distinction that Richard H. Pildes has
called the “legal lynchpin” of the case in “Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional
and Public Law,” Supreme Court Review (2013), 1, at 51. Instead, Chief Justice Roberts asserted, with
the briefest glance at evidence of such discrimination, that conditions in the covered and non-
covered jurisdictions currently differed too little to justify abrogating the “equal sovereignty” of
the states.  In other words,  the Chief  Justice did not simply disagree with Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s minority on the proper legal standard – whether a comparison between covered and
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non-covered jurisdictions was required by the constitution, and he did not merely express the
agnostic view that Congress might or might not have found a systematic difference between the
covered and non-covered areas if it had focused on that question. He made a positive assertion
that the empirical evidence, if examined, would have found little difference in the two sets of
states and counties. It  is this positive assertion, as well as the Chief Justice’s contention that
discrimination has dwindled so much that no invasion of state sovereignty is justified any longer,
that this paper addresses.
ABSTRACTS
In  June,  2013,  a  5-4  majority  of  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  brought  to  an  abrupt  and  likely
permanent  end the  most  important  provision of  the  most  successful  civil  rights  law in  U.S.
history.  Initially  passed  in  1965,  Section  5  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act  required  “covered
jurisdictions,” at first in the Deep South and later extended to Texas, Arizona, Alaska, and certain
counties and townships in other states, to “pre-clear” any changes in their election laws with the
Justice Department or the District Court of the District of Columbia before putting them into
effect. Laws that changed the political structure – for instance, redistricting laws, annexations,
and shifts from district to “at-large” elections for local governments – were restricted, as well as
provisions and practices that directly affected individuals’ rights to vote. While acknowledging
the success of the law in greatly increasing the number of African-American and Latino elected
officials, Chief Justice John Roberts contended in his majority opinion in Shelby County v. Holder
that the problems of 2013 were much less grave than the “pervasive . . . flagrant . . . widespread
. . . rampant” voting discrimination of 1965 and that the coverage formula was outmoded because
“today’s statistics tell an entirely different story.”1
Neither  the  Chief  Justice  nor  any  scholars  or  civil  rights  proponents  or  opponents  have
systematically examined the evidence on the entire pattern of proven voting rights violations
over time and space. Was the Chief Justice correct in asserting that such violations no longer
tracked the coverage scheme in Section 4 of the Act -- that, as he put it, the relationship of the
formula to problems of  vote dilution was purely “fortuitous?” Had the number of  violations
diminished so much in the years leading up to the 2006 renewal of Section 5 that Congress should
have ended preclearance altogether because discrimination had basically  disappeared? If  the
number of voting rights lawsuits has diminished, why is that so?
Based on the largest database of voting rights “events” – successful lawsuits, Section 5 Justice
Department objections and “more information requests,” and consent decrees or settlements out
of court that led to pro-minority changes – ever compiled, this paper provides a unique overview
of the history of U.S. voting rights from 1957, when the first U.S. civil rights law in 82 years
passed, through 2013. It shows that the Chief Justice’s factual assertions were incorrect, that the
coverage formula was still congruent with proven violations, and that to the extent that recorded
violations had decreased, that was not because problems had ended, but because the Supreme
Court had made it more difficult to win lawsuits.
En Juin  2013,  une majorité  de  la  Cour  suprême des  États-Unis  à  5  contre  4  a  mis  un terme
probablement définitif  à la disposition la plus importante d’une des lois les plus efficaces de
l’histoire américaine sur la protection des droits civiques. Initialement adopté en 1965, l’article 5
de la loi sur le droit de vote (Voting Rights Act) imposait aux « juridictions couvertes », d’abord
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dans le Sud et plus tard au Texas, en Arizona, en Alaska, et dans certains comtés dans d’autres
États, à valider préalablement auprès du Ministère de la justice ou de la district court du District
de Columbia tous les changements introduits dans leurs lois électorales. Les lois changeant la
structure politique ont été limitées (par exemple, le passage à des grandes circonscriptions à
scrutin de liste, le redécoupage électoral, les annexions) ainsi que les dispositions et les pratiques
qui impactaient directement le droit des individus à voter. Tout en reconnaissant le succès de la
loi qui augmenta considérablement le nombre des élus afro-américains et latinos, le Président de
la Cour suprême John Roberts a soutenu dans son opinion majoritaire dans l’arrêt Comté de Shelby
c. Holder que les problèmes de l’année 2013 étaient beaucoup moins graves que la discrimination
« omniprésente, ...flagrante ...  généralisée » de 1965 et que la formule permettant de calculer
quelles  juridictions  seraient  soumises  à  la  tutelle  fédérale  était  dépassée  parce  que  « les
statistiques d’aujourd’hui montrent une réalité totalement différente ».
Ni le président Roberts, ni aucun universitaire, ni aucun partisan ou opposant aux droits civiques
n’ont systématiquement examiné l’ensemble des preuves de violation des droits de vote dans le
temps  et  dans  l’espace.  Roberts  avait-il  raison  en  affirmant  que  de  telles  violations  ne
correspondaient plus au principe de couverture énoncé dans la section 4 de la loi ? D’après lui, la
relation entre la formule et les occurrences de dilution du vote était purement « fortuite ». La
diminution du nombre d’infractions dans les années qui ont précédé le renouvellement en 2006
de la Section 5 justifiait-elle que le Congrès mette un terme à cette mise sous tutelle fédérale, la
discrimination ayant en fait disparu ? Si le nombre de procès a diminué, quelles en furent les
raisons ?
Cet article fournit un aperçu unique de l’histoire du droit de vote aux États-Unis de 1957 à 2013,
en se fondant sur la plus grande base de données jamais compilée concernant le droit de vote
(poursuites  réussies,  objections  du  ministère  de  la  Justice  utilisant  la  Section  5,  « demande
d’informations complémentaires », décrets de consentement ou encore règlements à l’amiable
qui ont conduit à des changements favorables aux minorités).  Il  montre que les affirmations
factuelles  du  Président  de  la  Cour  suprême  étaient  incorrectes,  que  la  formule  permettant
d'imposer la mise sous tutelle était toujours en adéquation avec les violations avérées, et que si
les infractions ont diminué, cela n’a pas été parce que les problèmes avaient disparu mais parce
que la Cour suprême avait rendu les procès plus difficiles à gagner.
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